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Abstract
The proliferation of preferential trade liberalization over the last 20 years has raised the question
of whether it slows down multilateral trade liberalization. Recent theoretical and empirical evidence
indicates this is the case even for unilateral preferences that developed countries provide to small
and poor countries but there is no estimate of the resulting welfare costs. To avoid this stumbling
block eﬀect we suggest replacing unilateral preferences by a ﬁxed import subsidy. We argue that
this scheme would reduce the drag of preferences on multilateral liberalization and generate a Pareto
improvement. More importantly, we provide the ﬁrst estimates of the welfare cost of preferential
liberalization as a stumbling block to multilateral liberalization. By combining recent estimates
of the stumbling block eﬀect of preferences with data for 170 countries and over 5,000 products
we calculate the welfare eﬀects of the United States, European Union and Japan switching from
unilateral preferences to Least Developed Countries to the import subsidy scheme. Even in a model
with no dynamic gains to trade we ﬁnd that the switch produces an annual net welfare gain for the
170 countries ($4,354 million) and for each group: the United States, European Union and Japan
($2,934 million), Least Developed Countries ($520 million) and the rest of the world ($900 million).
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d1I n t r o d u c t i o n
One of the main pillars of the multilateral trading system is supposedly non-discrimination across
trading partners: the most-favored-nation (MFN) principle embodied in the ﬁrst article of the General
Agreement on Tariﬀs and Trade (GATT). However, currently nearly all WTO members are members of
preferential trade agreements (PTAs) and trade within PTAs accounts for a third of world trade. The
potential for PTAs being a stumbling block to multilateral trade liberalization (MTL) was an important
concern during the Uruguay Round.1 The focus of this paper is with the more recent concern within
the Doha Round that even unilateral trade preferences provided to small and poor developing countries
c a ns l o wd o w nM T Lb yt h el a r g ed e v e l o p e dc o u n t r i e st h a tp r o v i d et h e m . 2 This is considered to be a
suﬃciently important problem that the IMF recently approved the creation of a special lending program
aimed at developing countries “to mitigate concerns (...) that their balance of payments positions could
suﬀer, albeit temporarily, as multilateral liberalization changes their competitive position in world
markets. Chief among these concerns is that broad-based tariﬀ liberalization might erode the value of
their preferential access to important export markets.”3 According to the WTO’s director general the
IMF’s program is “a welcome contribution to the Doha Round, in particular to attaining ambitious
market access results”.4
Several factors explain the prominence of this issue in the Doha round. First, until recently many
preferences were given as a share of MFN tariﬀs and in some cases the preferential tariﬀ was positive.
T h i sm e a n tt h a ta f t e raM F Nt a r i ﬀ reduction there was still room to maintain a given preference margin
by lowering the preferential tariﬀ. Currently, several preferential programs for developing countries
feature duty and quota-free access and therefore any reductions in MFN tariﬀs by the preference
giving countries lower the preference margin. Second, until recently even the most generous unilateral
preference programs had numerous exceptions and constraints. Therefore preference erosion could
previously be addressed, and in fact it often was, by increasing the coverage or reducing the stringency
1According to Bhagwati (1991) a PTA is a building block if it accelerates MTL and a stumbling block if it slows it
down.
2According to a recent article of the Economist a key reason for the Doha Round to collapse is that “poor countries
with preferential access to rich world markets want to make sure that freer trade will not reduce these preferences.”
“Talking the talk”, July 17
th 2004, p. 14.
3IMF Press Release No. 04/73, April 13, 2004. See IMF 2004 for details.
4April 24th 2004 speech at the International Monetary and Financial Committee. For an interesting discussion, see
Winters (2004). The conjecture that preference erosion would reduce MTL is not new: it was an argument used against
the Generalized System of Preferences provided to developing countries when it was originally proposed. (Johnson [1967]
p. 166)
1of certain requirements.5
A somewhat puzzling question is that if the major losses from erosion are concentrated among a few
small countries and products (Subramanian [2004]) then how can they signiﬁcantly aﬀect the outcome
of the Doha Round?6 One explanation is that the current round was designated a “development round”,
which created an expectation that it would beneﬁt developing countries. A common complaint from
developing countries is that most GATT rules were decided by developed countries (Srinivasan [1999]).
However, as Mattoo and Subramanian (2004) argue, under the WTO developing countries have gained
de jure and de facto power relative to the GATT days, which implies that a few small countries can
have an impact in the outcome of the round. This impact is magniﬁed when the small set of countries
that stand to lose considerably from preference erosion are joined by others that perceive such losses
to be important to them as well. This points to the importance of further research and dissemination
of basic facts about gains from preferences.7
An additional reason, which we will focus on, why preferences to small countries can aﬀect the MTL
is that the developed countries providing them may themselves want to maintain them, as they can be
used as a side payment for cooperation on other issues. Here are two brief examples. First, in 2000
the European Commission argued that a cut in the price support of about 25% in E.U. sugar was not
tenable because it would cause an income loss of 250 million euros to a group of developing countries
that export sugar to the E.U. under preferential treatment.8 Second, the U.S. recognizes that its MFN
tariﬀ reductions hinder its ability to extract concessions in terms of enforcing labor, environmental
standards, etc, from the countries that export under a preference to the U.S.9
5This is what happened after the Uruguay Round with unilateral preferences such as the E.U.’s Everything but Arms
and the U.S.’s African Growth Opportunity Act extending preferences to agriculture and textiles and eliminating quantity
restrictions. Moreover, these are sectors where the developed countries maintain high MFN protection so duty-free access
generates a large preference margin and potentially large gains to developing countries in products that they actually
have a comparative advantage in.
6Alexandraki and Lankes (2004) ﬁnd that for middle-income countries these products include bananas, sugar and
textiles
7There is some debate regarding the eﬀectiveness of preferences in generating additional exports. Haveman and Shatz
(2003) provide evidence, that the unilateral preferences of the Triad countries considerably increased their imports from
LDCs in 2000. Sapir (1981) and Sapir and Ludenberg (1984) provide earlier estimates of the GSP scheme of the E.U. and
U.S. respectively. Brown (1989) provides a CGE analysis of Japan’s GSP. UNCTAD (2003) and Hoekman, Michalopoulos
and Winters (2004) and Stevens and Kennan (2004) propose several recommendations to realize the potential net beneﬁts
of preferences for LDCs including ways to improve utilization rates, relax and harmonize rules of origin, increase the
predictability of preferences through binding them in the WTO, etc. Many of these recommendations will also apply to
our proposed alternative of import subsidies.
8European Commission (2000), “Commission proposes overhaul of sugar market.” Brussels, 10/4/2000. IP/00/1109.
9According to the International Trade director of the General Accounting Oﬃce in the U.S.: “Because GSP beneﬁts
are limited, and would decline if the GATT Uruguay Round agreement is enacted, the program provides only a modest
degree of leverage to encourage beneﬁciary country governments to change their country practices [for enforcing intellectual
2The fear that PTAs could be a stumbling block to MTL has generated a considerable theoretical
literature.10 Given the second-best nature of PTAs it is not surprising that some models predict such an
outcome and others contradict it. However, most of these models have a common driving mechanism:
PTAs aﬀect MTL via the eﬀe c tt h a tp r e f e r e n t i a lt a r i ﬀs have on trade volumes and prices within the
PTA. Therefore, since the unilateral preferences that the U.S. and the E.U. extend to small countries
have little impact on prices and quantities in the U.S. and the E.U., most of the existing models fail
to predict that such preferences could aﬀect the U.S. or the E.U.’s MFN tariﬀs.
Contrary to previous work Limão (2002) provides a model where preferences that are extended to
small countries can cause large countries to maintain higher MFN tariﬀs. The stumbling block eﬀect
arises due to an important feature of current agreements by the U.S. and the E.U. Increasingly they oﬀer
lower trade barriers in exchange for cooperation by small developing countries in non-trade issues such
as labor and environmental standards, intellectual property protection, drug enforcement, emigration,
human rights, etc.11 Thus the preferential margins extended to small countries are a payment for
cooperation and so a reduction in MFN tariﬀs that reduces the preferential margin will be resisted
both by the country that receives the preference and by the one oﬀering it.12
The following example illustrates the intuition behind the problem and its solution. The U.S. MFN
tariﬀ on ﬂowers is 10% but Colombia can export them at a preferential tariﬀ equal to zero, so it enjoys
a preferential margin of 10% in the U.S. Suppose that, in the absence of any preferences, the U.S.
would choose to reduce that MFN tariﬀ to zero in the Doha round. If it did so then the preferential
tariﬀ margin it could oﬀer to Colombia would be zero. The model then predicts that, if the U.S. must
provide a preference to Colombia to extract cooperation on a non-trade issue, it would not reduce
the MFN tariﬀ all the way to zero. The conceptual solution to this problem is simple: allow for a
preferential import subsidy that maintains the preference margin unchanged relative to the initial 10%
MFN tariﬀ. If the U.S. charges the MFN tariﬀ on Colombian ﬂowers but pays a ﬁxed subsidy rate
of 10% to the Colombian producers all participants are initially indiﬀerent. However, the U.S. could
now maintain the ﬁxed subsidy rate and reduce its MFN tariﬀ without the opposition that arises from
property rights and labor standards] (...) It should be noted that tariﬀ reductions negotiated in GATT, if implemented,
will reduce the value of the GSP’s tariﬀ preference by 40 % and, therefore, the incentive for beneﬁciary countries to
participate in the GSP program.” Testimony before the Subcommittee on International Trade. In “International Trade:
Issues Concerning the Generalized System of Preferences”, GAO/T-GGD-94-174, June 20th , 1994.
10See Bagwell and Staiger (1998), Levy (1997), Krishna (1998). Winters (2001) provides an excellent review.
11In the appendix we provide references to other side conditions.
12International trade lawyers have also warned of the possibility that GSP will retard the MTL of the developed
countries that grant such preferences because of a similar mechanism. (Trebilcock and Howse [1999], p.462-463).
3preference erosion and the U.S. desire to extract cooperation through such preferences.
Although preferences to small and poor countries may not cause the current round to completely
fail they are quite likely to cause less MTL. To assess the welfare costs of preferences in terms of lost
MTL we require an estimate of the stumbling block eﬀect generated by PTAs. Until recently, there
was little systematic evidence on the eﬀect of PTAs on MTL. Limão (2005) and Karacaovali and Limão
(2005) provide such estimates for the U.S. and the E.U. during the Uruguay Round for various of their
PTAs, including their unilateral preferences to developing countries. We combine these estimates with
data for 170 countries and approximately 5,000 goods to provide the ﬁrst welfare estimates of PTAs as
a stumbling block. To do so we calculate the welfare eﬀects from the average expected MFN reductions
in the Doha round relative to the subsidy counterfactual, which entails additional reductions by the
TRIAD countries: the US, EU and Japan.
Our criteria in choosing the counterfactual to analyze the cost of preferences as a stumbling block
were the following. It should remove the stumbling block eﬀect, generate a Pareto improvement in
the context of a well deﬁned model, so we can expect it to be supported by WTO members, and be
simple enough to permit estimation and implementation. When the import subsidy is designed to
mimic the preferences it fulﬁlls these criteria, as we will show. Eliminating unilateral preferences or
replacing them with direct transfers to reward cooperation would remove the stumbling block. However,
simply eliminating preferences would not be supported by several countries so it is not an interesting
counterfactual. Using cash transfers may also not be the most eﬃcient way to transfer resources to
other countries, as the aid vs. trade literature highlights, or reward cooperation.13 Political economy
constraints that reduce the eﬀectiveness of cash transfers relative to preferences are present in practice,
otherwise we would not observe several of the current preference schemes.14 Therefore, as an alternative
to preferences, the subsidy scheme may also dominate direct transfers and therefore it is an appropriate
counterfactual to estimate the opportunity cost of preferences.
13Thus our proposal diﬀers considerably from others that suggest temporary development assistance to the governments
of developing countries that are hurt by preference erosion, e.g. Hoekman (2004). See McCulloch and Pinera (1977) on
the issue of trade and aid issue and Adam and O’Connell (2004) for a more recent analysis. Azam and Laﬀont (2003)
analyze the diﬃculty of writing eﬀective contracts for aid due to informational and political problems.
14For example, if some individuals in the preference granting country do not value the cooperation then they will oppose
a direct transfer to obtain it. This is more diﬃcult with the indirect transfer that arises with the preference because trade
policy is not revised every year whereas budgets are. Moreover, the indirect transfer through a preferential tariﬀ may be
somewhat more “disguised” than the direct transfer. In the receiving country, cash from a direct transfer may end up in
a politician’s pocket and thus not provide the incentives for the intended supply of cooperation. For example, one of the
stated aims of the U.S. in providing preferences to the Andean countries is to raise the relative price to activities other
than drug production.
4We focus on a subset of PTAs that ﬁt the assumptions of the theory: the preferences that the
TRIAD extends to LDCs. We estimate annual welfare gains for the 48 LDCs of $520 million, we also
calculate these gains by country and ﬁnd that all except one gain. The maximum gain is 6.7% of
GDP per year and the average is 0.38%. Importantly, the countries that most oppose MTL because
of its preference erosion eﬀe c ta r et h eo n e sw ee s t i m a t eg a i nt h em o s tf r o mt h es w i t c h .W e l f a r ef o rt h e
TRIAD would increase by $2934 million per year, due mainly to the additional MFN tariﬀ reductions
that would be allowed by the subsidy. For the same reason, the rest of the world experiences an annual
welfare gain of $900 million, this is important since an important concern with PTAs is that they do
not internalize any costs on outsiders.15 In relative terms the LDCs as a group gain the most, over 0.5
%o fG D Pp e ry e a r ,w h i c hi so v e r5 0t i m e st h eﬁgure for the TRIAD.
The aggregate annual welfare eﬀect of $4354 million is likely to be a lower bound of the stumbling
block eﬀect of PTAs for several reasons. First, it applies only to the unilateral preferences extended to
a subset of countries and therefore to a subset of goods that are subject to a stumbling block eﬀect.
Second, the stumbling block estimates in Limão (2005) are larger when they apply to all PTA partners
so there would be a bigger potential for MTL if the switch applied to all of the TRIAD’s PTAs. Third,
since we want to estimate the eﬀects at the disaggregated tariﬀ line level, we use a model where there
are no dynamic gains from trade, which is known to typically generate modest gains from liberalization.
Finally, we may be overestimating the amount of liberalization that is possible under the preference
scheme since there is the possibility that the concern with preference erosion will prevent the completion
of the round. If so we estimate that the preferences would cost an additional $47 billion in terms of
lost multilateral liberalization.
The structure of the paper is the following. In section 2 we provide a theoretical framework that
explains how preferential treatment to small countries can generate a stumbling block, and discuss
the recent evidence that supports it. In section 3 we calculate the welfare eﬀects for 170 countries of
preferences as a stumbling block, relative to a counterfactual with an import subsidy, in the context
of the unilateral preferences provided by the U.S., E.U. and Japan to various sub groups of least
developed countries. Although an import subsidy is conceptually simple it is not commonly utilized so
in section 4 we address issues related to its implementation. In the ﬁnal section we discuss the results
and contrast our proposal with others. In the appendix we provide a brief description of the main
15Chang and Winters (2002) provide evidence that Mercosur aﬀected non-members but focus on the direct eﬀect it had
in depressing non-members’ export prices into Mercosur rather than calculating welfare eﬀects.
5types of preferential programs, with particular focus on unilateral preferences.
2 Preferences as a stumbling block to MTL: theory and evidence
2.1 Theory
PTAs can aﬀect MFN tariﬀs through various channels. They can divert scarce negotiation resources
and alter the number of negotiating parties and their bargaining power. In the context of unilateral
preferences that we analyze these eﬀects are not as relevant as the one in the model that we now
provide an overview of. This simple model shows two things. First, the unilateral trade preferences
that large countries use can cause them to maintain higher multilateral tariﬀs even if the preferences
are extended to small countries. Second, an import subsidy resolves this problem.16
Each regional bloc contains a large and a small country, which we denote by L and S. There
exist two externalities within each bloc. First, L is aﬀected by the level of an action e,t h a tS can
undertake at a cost. This is a general way to capture the demand that L has for cooperation in labor,
environmental, emigration issues, improvements in governance, etc. Second, there is a terms-of-trade
externality, that is L can use a tariﬀ to depress the price of S’s exports. The countries in a bloc can
internalize these eﬀects via a PTA where L lowers its tariﬀso nS’s exports in exchange for an increase
in the latter’s provision of e. The PTA is modeled such that its only direct trade eﬀect is to increase
the price that S receives for its exports.17
There are two import tariﬀst h a tL chooses: t, the multilateral tariﬀ that it applies to the rest of
the world, and tp ≤ t, the preferential tariﬀ on that good applied to imports from S. The good that L
exports to the rest of the world faces a tariﬀ tr. So, the objective function that L maximizes is:
WL = WL(e,tp,t,t r) (1)
where the partial eﬀects are WL
e > 0 and, due to terms-of-trade eﬀects, WL
x > 0 for x = tp,t when
evaluated at x =0and WL
tr < 0.
The objective maximized by S depends on e and the tariﬀss e tb yL,w h i c ha ﬀect the price that S
16This is a simpliﬁed version of the model in Limão (2002).
17In doing so the model abstracts from issues of trade diversion and creation to focus on an alternative channel for
the impact of PTAs on multilateral tariﬀs that is particularly relevant for the preferences oﬀered to small developing
countries.
6receives for its exports.18
WS = WS(e,tp,t) (2)
Under a PTA S receives an export price of pw(t)+t − tp,w h e r epw(t) is the equilibrium world price,
so pw(t)+t is the price in L. Therefore, WS
tp < 0 and WS
t > 0. But, in the absence of a PTA, S
faces the multilateral tariﬀ and receives only pw(t), which falls when t is raised and so WS
t < 0.F o r
simplicity we assume that S has no trade in the good exported by L to the rest of the world and thus
is indiﬀerent about the level of tr.19
The crucial assumption that generates a motive for L’s preferential treatment for S is that it values
e suﬃciently relative to S.20 We take the neutral case where S places neither a positive nor a negative
weight on the direct eﬀect of e on itself and simply assume that this action requires some expenditure
on the part of S, which implies a negative marginal beneﬁt in terms of the numeraire. So, if S and
L do not cooperate, S does not supply e and L does not provide a preference. They can improve on
this outcome through a bargain where L sets tp <tand S supplies e. Note that, for given t,t h i s
bargain may be just as eﬃcient as a lump-sum transfer from L given that we assume preferences are
quasilinear so that the tariﬀ revenue that L is giving up through the preference has the same eﬀect as
an equivalent lump-sum transfer. As we pointed out in the introduction, there can be realistic political
economy constraints that would deliver the preference as the constrained ﬁrst-best policy to be used in
exchange for e, here we simply assume that the preference is the only available instrument and analyze
the implications for the multilateral tariﬀ.
In most of the agreements that we analyze in the data L has nearly all the bargaining power relative
to S. Therefore it is sensible to focus on the outcome of a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer that leaves S at the
status quo welfare level. If S is a WTO member then the maximum tariﬀ that L can set is tp = t,d u e
to the MFN rule. Therefore the status quo welfare will be determined by evaluating tp at t and e at
the level that is optimal for S.21 So, for a given level of t and tp, we can write the equilibrium level
of eb as a function eb(tp,t). This function is decreasing in the preferential tariﬀ and increasing in the
MFN tariﬀ because either movement raises WSand thus allows L to extract a higher level of e.I nt h e
18We could add trade policy for S but as long as it occurs in separate products and there is separability it would not
aﬀect results.
19The balance of payments condition is satisﬁed through a numeraire good that enters utilities in a quasi-linear way
and that L uses to pay for its imports from S.
20This may either be due to a diﬀerence in preferences, an income eﬀect, or simply a scale eﬀect if e is a public good
(or bad) and there are more individuals in L.




b <t ,t ) ≥ W
S(e =0 ,t
p = t,t).
7simple case we focus on the net exports of S are constant and it can be shown that this implies that,
in the function eb(tp,t), S cares only about the preferential margin t − tp so eb
t = −eb
tp > 0.22
In the GATT/WTO countries negotiate reciprocal tariﬀ reductions with their principal suppliers.
So, if the rest of the world (ROW) is the main supplier of the good that L also imports from S then L
negotiates with the ROW. To capture this we model the equilibrium multilateral tariﬀsa st h es o l u t i o n
that maximizes the joint objective of L and the ROW.23 Moreover, here we assume that L chooses the
preferential tariﬀ simultaneously and further simplify by assuming that the ROW is a mirror image of
L, although neither of these assumptions are essential for the result. This implies that we can focus
on solving for t since it will be equal to tr and that the eﬀect of t on Wr is identical to that of tr on
WL. Imposing the equilibrium conditions of symmetry, t = tr,a n de = eb(tp,t) the joint optimum for
L and the ROW under a PTA is given by the following program and necessary ﬁrst-order conditions









t ≤ 0 (5)
To see how a stumbling block can arise when import subsidies are not allowed let’s contrast this with
the condition for the tariﬀ in the absence of a PTA. Now L has no incentive to provide a preference to
S so t = tpand e =0 , which yields the following solution:
t  ≡ argt maxWL(e =0 ,t p = t,t,tr = t) (6)
Using the FOC derived for this last problem, WL
t + WL
tr + WL
tp =0 , to evaluate the FOC for t when a
22In the estimation we do not impose this condition.
23We follow Bagwell Staiger (1999). in assuming that the main motive for the reciprocal trade liberalization agreement
between L and ROW is to internalize a terms-of-trade externality between them. Here, we abstract from enforcement
issues by assuming that L and ROW are suﬃciently patient that they can sustain the most cooperative solution through
repeated interaction. Limão (2002) analyzes the eﬀects of binding incentive constraints.






















where the inequality in the ﬁrst line reﬂects the use of (4). If import subsidies were allowed then tp
could continue to be lowered below zero and the inequality above would disappear since an interior
solution could be found. But otherwise it is possible to obtain a corner solution in the PTA, that is a
situation where, at tp =0 , L would like S to increase e. In this case, (4) holds with a strict inequality.
T h es e c o n dl i n eo f( 7 )i sz e r oi nt h ec a s ew ec o n s i d e rw h e r e−eb
tp = eb
t,i . e .w h e na ni n c r e a s ei nt h eM F N
tariﬀ has the same eﬀect as a decrease in the preferential tariﬀ, both simply increase the preferential
margin. This implies that ˆ t>t   if and only if [WL
tp + WL
e eb
tp]tp=0 < 0. So, import subsidies completely
eliminate the need to distort the MFN tariﬀ to maintain a preference margin.
2.2 Evidence
Before estimating the costs of the stumbling block eﬀect that arises in the theoretical model we provide
some direct evidence for it, which we subsequently use in our quantiﬁcation. The theoretical model
generates speciﬁc testable predictions. At an extreme if the MFN tariﬀ i sz e r on ot a r i ﬀ preference
can be oﬀered and so no preferential agreement is possible in the absence of subsidies. Therefore, to
the extent that the U.S. and E.U. value the cooperation with the side conditions in those agreements,
reductions in MFN tariﬀs on products imported from the preferential partner are more costly than
reductions in similar products.
Limão (2005) estimates the direct eﬀect of the U.S.’s PTAs on its MFN tariﬀsb ye x p l o r i n gt h ef a c t
that this eﬀect will be weaker for goods it imports only from non-PTA countries. Using tariﬀ data for
over 5000 products he ﬁnds that the U.S.’s PTAs generated a stumbling block eﬀect in the Uruguay
Round. After controlling for several determinants of U.S. tariﬀ changes during the Uruguay Round he
estimates that the U.S.’s average cut for goods exported by any of its PTAs was about half that of other
goods. The eﬀect is stronger for products that are exported under all PTAs or constitute relatively
larger shares of a given PTA’s exports to the U.S. The average cut for GSP goods on their own was
on average only 74% relative to non-PTA goods. Interestingly the estimates also allow a calculation of
the direct eﬀect on the U.S. MFN tariﬀs for all its goods: it would have been about 1 percentage point
9lower on average in the absence of its PTAs. For the case of GSP only that ﬁgure is about 0.3. 24
Karacaovali and Limão (2005) provide structural estimates of the stumbling block eﬀect for the
E.U. They ﬁnd eﬀects that are qualitatively and quantitatively similar to the ones for the U.S. More
speciﬁcally, after controlling for several determinants of the E.U.’s MFN tariﬀ changes in the UR they
ﬁnd that the E.U.’ average cut for goods exported by any of its PTAs was about half that of other
goods. The model predicts that if the preferential tariﬀ is positive then the MFN tariﬀ can still be
reduced without aﬀecting the preference margin, by simply lowering the preferential tariﬀ by the same
amount. Karacaovali and Limão (2005) ﬁnd evidence of this: there is no stumbling block eﬀect when
the preferential tariﬀ can still be lowered. This strongly supports our argument that an import subsidy,
by removing the non-negativity constraint for tariﬀs, would indeed eliminate the stumbling block eﬀect.
3 Welfare estimates of preferences as a stumbling block to MTL
As we argue in the introduction we believe the import subsidy provides a good counterfactual to
estimate the opportunity cost of preferences. In this section we describe the methodology, data and
estimates of this cost for the world and speciﬁc countries. Our focus is on the unilateral preferences
that the TRIAD extends to 49 LDCs.
3.1 Methodology
We present the methodology used to quantify the subsidy that each granting country (SGC) would need
to pay a subsidy receiving country (SRC). This provides both an input into the ﬁnal welfare calculation
but also a measure that may preempt any practical concern of budgetary costs of implementation.25
We then describe the framework to calculate the welfare eﬀects due to the additional MTL that the
subsidy permits and the ﬁnal welfare eﬀects from switching to the subsidy scheme. This gain from
switching provides the opportunity cost of the preferences.
24The results on multilateral tariﬀ reductions can also be used to derive the eﬀect on U.S. and world prices. The price
eﬀects for goods exported under any of the U.S.’s PTAs were on average only 52% of those in similar non-PTA goods
(74% for GSP). If the good was exported by every PTA then the eﬀect was even smaller, 23%.
25An important motive to compute this cost for the United States is that the ”pay-as-you-go” rules for revenue and
direct spending of the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990 require that any revenue or spending legislation be oﬀset.
103.1.1 Budgetary cost to the SGC
We choose the initial import subsidy rate for each good to be equal to the current preference margin for
two reasons. First, it provides us with a convenient benchmark to calculate welfare changes because the
initial switch from a preference to a subsidy at a similar rate leaves all prices and quantities unchanged.
Second, governments considering this proposal should ﬁnd it re-assuring that initially it does not aﬀect
the status quo. Naturally, alternative initial subsidies are possible and would deliver diﬀerent results.




where si i st h ea d v a l o r e ms u b s i d yr a t et h a tw ec h o o s et oe q u a lt h ed i ﬀerence between the current
MFN and preferential tariﬀ, ti − t
p
i, i.e. the current preferential margin, as in the theoretical model.
T h ew o r l dp r i c ei spw and m represents the quantity exported by a SRC to a SGC at the current pw
and tariﬀs. This subsidy value can be easily calculated using current data on MFN tariﬀs, preferences
and exports if we assume full utilization of preferences. This is also the ﬁg u r eo f t e nu s e dt op r o v i d e
an approximation of the yearly potential gains to beneﬁciaries of the preference schemes in terms of
export revenues.26
The budgetary cost of the switch for the granting country is zero in the absence of MFN tariﬀ
reductions since Si in (8) is equal to the tariﬀ revenue it currently foregoes due to the preference.
However, reductions in the MFN tariﬀ cause changes in pw and m that consequently change the
subsidy level. To calculate the resulting prices and quantities we use the worldwide partial equilibrium
model of traded goods described in the appendix, where we assume that all WTO members would cut
their tariﬀs by 33% in the current round of negotiations.27 Using an “∗”t od e n o t et h ev a l u e sa f t e r
the MFN tariﬀ reductions we have S∗
i = sipw∗m∗. We recall that the subsidy rate is unchanged by
construction but the tariﬀ revenue is now collected at the lower tariﬀ, t∗. Thus, for a good i imported
preferentially the budgetary cost of moving from the preference to the subsidy scheme when the MFN
26Currently these preferences are not fully utilized (Inama [2003]) so it is likely that would also be the case under the
subsidy. Therefore our estimates of the cost of the subsidy and preference erosion are likely to be an upper bound for the
true eﬀects. However, since our main interest is in comparing the outcome under the preference relative to the subsidy we
don’t believe that deviations from full utilization rate will be quantitatively important since they generate similar eﬀects
under the two scenarios.
27It is diﬃcult to determine what the likely average cut of the Doha Round will be, but an average cut of 33 percent
was agreed for developed countries in the Uruguay Round.
11tariﬀ is reduced to t∗
i is:










The term in the ﬁrst parenthesis represents the subsidy cost minus the tariﬀ revenue collected on
imports from the SRC. The second term represents tariﬀ revenue that would have been collected if
the preference scheme had been in place, where mp∗denotes import quantities from LDCs under the
preference scheme after the MFN tariﬀ reduction.28
There is an additional budgetary implication associated with the introduction of the subsidy scheme.
The theoretical model predicts that the move will allow an additional MFN tariﬀ reduction, which will
change world prices and thus aﬀect tariﬀ revenue and the subsidy. Using estimates from Limão (2005)
we estimate this additional liberalization to be 25% of the 33% benchmark (or an additional 8.3%).

























where the prime notation denotes the value of the variables evaluated at the equilibrium under the
subsidy with a larger MFN liberalization than under the preference scheme, and the superscript r is
for imports from ROW. The last term is the change in tariﬀ revenue, which can be positive or negative
depending on the import demand elasticities.
3.1.2 Welfare Eﬀects for the SGC
Ultimately we are interested in the full welfare eﬀects that arise from switching to the subsidy scheme,
i.e. the relative cost of maintaining the preferential scheme in terms of lost multilateral liberalization.
Denoting the welfare level for the SGC, L,b yWLp under the preference and WLs under the subsidy if
it reduced the MFN tariﬀs by the same amount, the diﬀerence between the two is simply the amount
of the budgetary eﬀect in (9):29
WLs − WLp =
[
i Bi (11)
28Note that equation (9) assumes —as we do later in the partial equilibrium model used to estimate the impact of tariﬀ
reduction on world prices–that these LDCs are too small to inﬂuence world prices when preferences are granted (or
replaced by the subsidy scheme). Panagariya et al (2001) provide detailed econometric evidence that this is a reasonable
assumption for products that Bangladesh exports to the US under the Multi-Fibre Arrangement.
29Assuming that the eﬀect of small changes in the export supply of SRC on the world price are negligible.
12The additional MTL permitted by the subsidy causes an extra welfare eﬀe c t ,w h i c hw ed e n o t eb y
∆WLs
i . So the total welfare eﬀect of the switch for each SGC, which we report in Table 2, is the sum
of these two eﬀects over all the products:
WLs  − WLp =
[
i ∆WLs




i we start with the income-expenditure identity in each SGC after the subsidy









where e is the minimum expenditure necessary to achieve u at the domestic prices, p,1i st h ep r i c eo f
the numeraire and r is the maximum revenue given the (ﬁxed) endowments, v, at the domestic prices
p. The total level of imports of i is M∗
i = m∗
i + mr∗
i .T o t a l l yd i ﬀerentiating (13), using Shephard and
























where eu is the inverse of the marginal utility of income; and x∗
i are export quantities when the world
price is pw∗
i .T h et e r mi nt h eﬁrst parenthesis represents changes in surplus due to price changes, the
second captures tariﬀ revenue eﬀects and the last one the change in the subsidy expenditure. Using
the deﬁnition of import demand elasticity, the change in imports, dMi,i sg i v e nb y :
dMi =  miˆ piM∗
i (15)
where  mi is the elasticity of import demand. In the data section we discuss the estimates of the
elasticities we use. The term.ˆ pi represents the percentage change in domestic prices, ˆ pi =ˆ pw
i +dti/(1+
t∗
i). To calculate the change in world prices due to the extra MFN reduction by all TRIAD members
we use the partial equilibrium model described below and in more detail in the appendix.
3.1.3 Welfare Eﬀects for the SRC
For SRCs the welfare eﬀects are also given by (14) with two basic diﬀerences. First, we assume that
the SRCs are not lowering their tariﬀs by more than 33% and since it is this extra liberalization that
13is reﬂected in (14), the welfare eﬀects for SRCs do not include terms that involve own liberalization.
Second, the SRCs are not paying subsidies and so the two last terms in (14) are also absent. So for the
SRC denoted by S we have:
[
i ∆WSs










The variables in (16) correspond to the SRCs and its values are diﬀerent from those in (14) although
we use similar notation. We also note that for the SRCs the consumer and producer price may diverge
because of the subsidy the exporters receive, so the change in price for a producer that exports a good
t oaS G Ci sdpi =[ 1+si]dpw
i , whereas for the consumer it is [1 + ti]dpw
i , where ti here refers to the
SRCs’ tariﬀ.30 Moreover, we note that the welfare of the SRCs is aﬀected both on the export and
import side because all world prices are changing. Thus the SRCs can see their welfare increase or
decrease and one cannot clearly sign this ap r i o r i .
To obtain the total welfare change in the SRCs, we need to add the change in welfare that is
associated with the switch from the preference to the subsidy scheme if both had the same 33% MFN
tariﬀ reduction. The only diﬀerence between the preference and subsidy equilibrium after the 33%
MFN reduction is that the price received by exporters under the subsidy is (1 + ti − t
p
i)pw∗
i ,w h i c h




i , due to the preference erosion
eﬀect.31 This leads to a higher producer surplus under the subsidy scheme, which we approximate as









i ). This extra eﬀect of the subsidy scheme
is added to (16) to calculate the ﬁnal welfare eﬀect for SRCs that is reported in tables 2 and A.2.














which is simply the diﬀerence between the preferential tariﬀ rent before and after a 33% reduction in
MFN tariﬀs, taking into account the supply response. This is reported in the last column of table 1.
30Therefore in our estimates we calculate separately the eﬀects that arise through the imports and exports in the case
of goods that are subject to preferences.
31The reason for no other eﬀects is that world prices are identical under the preference and subsidy scheme after the
33% MFN reduction and we assume no substitution or income eﬀects in demand. Thus consumption and imports for the
SRCs are identical under the two scenarios.
143.1.4 Price and quantity eﬀects
The model used to estimate changes in world prices, imports and welfare is a simple partial equilibrium
model for each of the six-digit tariﬀ lines existing in the Harmonized System (HS) classiﬁcation. We
assume that each tariﬀ line includes a homogenous good and that the world market for each of them
is in equilibrium. There are no substitution or income eﬀects on the demand or supply side. Using
estimates of import demand and export supply elasticities, we can then solve for the percentage change
in world prices associated with a tariﬀ reduction in any (or all) 170 countries in the sample. These
changes in world prices are then plugged into individual countries import demand and export supply
functions to obtain quantities, using (15), and import revenue and export revenue eﬀects, using (18)
in the appendix, where we provide further details of the model.
3.2 Data
We focus exclusively on preferences granted by the TRIAD to 48 LDCs under their GSP schemes. In the
case of the E.U., these are simply ruled by the Everything But Arms (EBA) initiative, which generally
provides for duty and quota free access, as the statistics in Table A3 indicate. In the case of the
special treatment granted to LDCs under Japan’s GSP scheme we are using their current preferences
as introduced in 2002.32 Finally, in the case of the U.S., the treatment is not homogenous across LDCs,
as the variability in the average preference rate over diﬀerent countries shows in Table A3. Non-African
LDCs beneﬁt from the extended preferences granted to all LDCs under the U.S. GSP scheme. We are
using the LDCs preference rate as notiﬁed to the WTO in 1999, but there has been no change in
this regime since 1997. Most African LDCs beneﬁt from additional preferences through the African
Growth Opportunity Act (AGOA), which adds 1835 tariﬀ lines to the regular U.S. GSP program. More
signiﬁcantly, AGOA provides duty free access mostly without rules of origin requirements for apparel
products originating in AGOA beneﬁciaries which are also LDCs (or that have an income per capita
below $1000).33
The MFN tariﬀs for the TRIAD are taken from notiﬁcations to the WTO (2003 for Japan and
the U.S. and 2004 for the E.U.). Because a number of tariﬀ lines are subject to speciﬁc tariﬀs, and
WTO notiﬁcations do not calculate ad-valorem equivalents for these tariﬀ lines, we used the OECD
32See Handbook on the scheme of Japan 2002/2003 (UNCTAD/ITCD/TSB/Misc.42/Rev.2), available at
www.unctad.org.
33The special apparel provision is subject to fulﬁlment of speciﬁc origin and visa requirements.
15(2003) estimates of ad-valorem equivalents of speciﬁct a r i ﬀs. We also need information on tariﬀsi nt h e
rest-of-the-world to estimate the impact that a potential 33% reduction in bound tariﬀsi nD o h aw i l l
have on world prices.34
Import and export data comes from the UN’s Comtrade. We take the average between 2001 and
2003 to smooth any year speciﬁc shock. If data is missing for a particular country, then we use data
for 2000 to calculate the average. For the few countries for which there is no data available between
2000 and 2003, we mirror the data using partners’ trade data. The partial equilibrium model also
requires estimates of import demand and export supply elasticities at the tariﬀ line level for every
country in the sample. These are taken from Kee, Nicita and Olarreaga (2004a, 2004b).35 Table A3
in the Appendix provides some summary statistics. The export-weighted tariﬀ faced by beneﬁciaries
countries in the European Union is zero, whereas it can be non-zero in Japan and the United States.
This is because the European Union has a very generous LDC speciﬁc preference program (Everything
But Arms), whereas Japan and the United States preferences to LDC generally have exemptions.
Notably, Bangladesh beneﬁts from almost no preference on its $ 2.6 billion of exports to the United
States, whereas it faces an export weighted tariﬀ of almost 11 percent. Similarly Vanuatu faces an
export-weighted average tariﬀ of almost 18 percent on its 17 million dollar of exports to the United
States. These LDCs represent a negligible share of total TRIAD imports, as assumed in the model.
Bangladesh’s share, the largest, is only 0.17 percent of total TRIAD imports.
3.3 Empirical Results
Table 1 provides estimates of the subsidy that the TRIAD would pay in the absence of tariﬀ reductions,
which, as we previously noted, is equal to the tariﬀ revenue currently forgone due to preferences given
to LDCs. The total value is $763 million, of which the largest share is the E.U.’s because of three
factors. First, the E.U. imports larger quantities from LDCs than Japan and the U.S. Second, European
preferences tend to be more generous under the EBA than under the LDC regimes of Japan and the
U.S. (including AGOA in the case of the U.S.), as we can see from Table A3. Third, the MFN tariﬀs
34We have an additional 130 countries in the data set. The tariﬀ data come from diﬀerent sources and we employ the
most recent year for which data is available between 1999 and 2004. Sources are UNCTAD’s TRAINS, WTO notiﬁcations
and OECD (2003) CD-ROM, as well as the earlier 2001 version.
35When elasticities were not estimated for particular countries in those studies we took the trade-weighted average
across all countries for those products. In the case of export supply elasticities, where for some tariﬀ lines they were not
able to estimate export supplies at the six-digit level, we took the country speciﬁc average across all tariﬀ lines within
the four digit level.
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The second column of Table 1 provides the amount of the subsidy after a 33 % reduction in bound
tariﬀs by all WTO members. The subsidy tends to be larger than the currently forgone tariﬀ revenue
because exports from SRCs increase due to the world price rise, which is itself caused by the multilateral
tariﬀ reductions. The total subsidy to SRCs granted by the TRIAD amounts to $768 million, and again
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Table 1. Budgetary impact of moving towards the subsidy scheme in Dohaa
(millions of U.S. dollars)
Subsidy Subsidy Cost of Switch Preference Erosion
(current MFN) (Post-Doha MFN)b (Post-Doha MFN)c (Post-Doha MFN)d
E.U. 669 674 208 441
Japan 31 32 6 17
U.S. 63 64 21 166
Total 763 768 235 624
Source: Authors calculations.
a. A decomposition of subsidies and preference erosion by SRC is provided in Table A1.
b. Assumes a 33% reduction in MFN tariﬀsb ya l lW T Om e m b e r s .S e e( 8 ) .
c. Assumes a 33% reduction in MFN tariﬀs by all WTO members and an additional 8.3% for TRIAD. See (10).
d. Assumes a 33% reduction in MFN tariﬀs by all WTO members. See equation (17).
The third column of Table 1 provides an estimate of the budgetary cost implied by the move towards
the subsidy scheme. As is clear from (9) this cost arises because the tariﬀ charged on the imports from
the SRC falls but the subsidy rate does not. Moreover, this shortfall applies to a larger volume of
imports because the MFN tariﬀ reductions increase world prices. The total budgetary cost for the
TRIAD is $235 million, of which most is incurred by the E.U. The budgetary cost for Japan and the
U.S. are marginal.36 Note that the third column in Table 1 excludes the impact of additional MFN
tariﬀ reduction that the move towards the subsidy scheme would allow. This would change the amount
of the subsidy as well as the tariﬀ revenue collected on imports from SRCs and the rest of the world
a n dw i l lb ea c c o u n t e df o ri no u rw e l f a r ec a l c u l a t i o ni nT a b l e2 .
36As a comparison, $235 million represents around 2 minutes of TRIAD’s agricultural support or 0.0001 %.
17The fourth column provides an estimate of the extent of preference erosion that SRCs would suﬀer
in each TRIAD market under a 33 % reduction in MFN tariﬀs and in the absence of a move towards
a subsidy scheme, as deﬁn e di n( 1 7 ) . 37 The preference erosion suﬀered by LDCs in TRIAD markets
would be much larger than the budgetary cost for the TRIAD of moving towards a subsidy scheme.
The LDC loss amounts to $624 million and the largest losses are incurred in the European market.38
Table A1 provides estimates by country. We calculate this ﬁgure not simply because it is a common
measure but because it is signiﬁcant for the purposes of identifying the countries that are, or should be,
most opposed to MTL liberalization on the basis of its impact on preference erosion. If these countries
gain considerably from switching to the subsidy a large obstacle to MTL may be removed. The three
countries that would face the largest losses due to erosion in absolute terms are Bangladesh ($202
million), Malawi ($151 million), and Madagascar ($63 million). As a share of GDP the top three losers
would be Malawi (8.6%), Lesotho (2.7%) and Sao Tome and Prince (1.6%). Finally, the results show
that the losses from preference erosion are concentrated in that for 26 of the 48 countries they would
represent less than 0.1% of GDP.
Although the switch towards the subsidy scheme has negative budgetary consequences for the
TRIAD, this does not imply it is not in the interest of those countries. Indeed, as the scheme provides
for extra liberalization, the budgetary cost could potentially be compensated by the additional welfare
gains derived in (14). Table 2 provides the estimate of the net welfare impact including this extra
liberalization on products subject to LDC preferences, given by (12) for SGCs. The annual gain for
the TRIAD is $2934 million and those governments should therefore be in favor of the switch. The
largest gain is for the E.U., $2336 million. Japan and the U.S. would also gain—$237 million and $361
million, respectively.39
Importantly, the group of 48 LDCs also beneﬁts from a switch to the subsidy.40 If changes in welfare
are much larger for the TRIAD when measured in absolute $ levels, relative to GDP the changes in
welfare are much large for LDCs (around 50 times larger). The aggregate gain for LDCs per year is $520
37All numbers for LDCs exclude Kiribati for which there is no data available.
38Previous estimates were around $530 million (see Subramanian, 2004). There are two main reasons for our larger
numbers. First, our estimated elasticities of export supply in LDCs are on average 5, which is larger than the value of
assumed for all goods in the WTO document, one. Second, our MFN tariﬀs include ad-valorem equivalents of speciﬁc
tariﬀs leading to larger preference erosion.
39The results do not appear to be driven by speciﬁc products such as sugar, which as we discuss in the introduction
provides an important example of the eﬀects we discuss. Excluding sugar the welfare gain for the EU is only $72 million
lower.
40There are 49 countries classiﬁed as LDCs but there is no data available to compute welfare gains for Kiribati.
18million, as shown in Table 2 and all but one gain. The loss for Djibouti, which is due to a deterioration
of its terms of trade associated with the extra TRIAD liberalization, is marginal ($0.07 million). There
are 27 LDCs that will remain indiﬀerent with net welfare changes below 0.1 % of GDP). The largest
absolute gains are for Bangladesh ($176 million), Malawi ($117 million) and Madagascar ($53 million).
In relative terms, it is Malawi (6.7%), Lesotho (2.1%) and Sao Tome and Prince (1.3%). Recall that
these were exactly the countries that stood to lose the most from preference erosion. So, if faced with
a choice between the preference and the subsidy scheme, the LDCs should support the latter and the
additional MTL it entails.
Table 2. Annual welfare cost of LDC preferences as a stumbling blocka,b
M i l l .U S$ %o fG D P c





Rest of the world 900 0.010
Total 4354 0.010
Source: Authors calculations.
a. See table A2 for welfare estimates for LDCs.
b. Estimate based on (12) and (16).
c. The GDP used to express welfare gains is for 2002 and is in current US $.
Importantly, the group of 48 LDCs also beneﬁts from a switch to the subsidy.41 If changes in welfare
are much larger for the TRIAD when measured in absolute $ levels, relative to GDP the changes in
welfare are much large for LDCs (around 50 times larger). The aggregate gain for LDCs per year is $520
million, as shown in Table 2 and all but one gain. The loss for Djibouti, which is due to a deterioration
of its terms of trade associated with the extra TRIAD liberalization, is marginal ($0.07 million). There
are 27 LDCs that will remain indiﬀerent with net welfare changes below 0.1 % of GDP). The largest
absolute gains are for Bangladesh ($176 million), Malawi ($117 million) and Madagascar ($53 million).
In relative terms, it is Malawi (6.7%), Lesotho (2.1%) and Sao Tome and Prince (1.3%). Recall that
41There are 49 countries classiﬁed as LDCs but there is no data available to compute welfare gains for Kiribati.
19these were exactly the countries that stood to lose the most from preference erosion. So, if faced with
a choice between the preference and the subsidy scheme, the LDCs should support the latter and the
additional MTL it entails.
The rest of the world gains $900 million, with 108 countries experiencing a gain and 11 a loss.
However, the country with the largest loss is Nigeria with $0.6 million. On the other hand, welfare
gains are as high as $167 million for China. We recall that the gains for the rest of the world occur as
a result of the additional liberalization made possible by switching to the subsidy scheme.42
We think that the aggregate welfare eﬀect of $4354 million is likely to be a lower bound of the cost of
PTAs as a stumbling block for MTL because we focus only on preferences to small developing countries.
Even for this subset we believe that our estimates are a lower bound for several reasons. First, we
recall that it refers to a yearly eﬀect. Given the static model that we use if there were no further
shocks after the implementation of the subsidy scheme the discounted welfare eﬀect would be several
times higher. Second, to calculate the welfare eﬀects we employ a static perfect competition model
with no externalities, which is well known to provide relatively small gains from trade liberalization.43
Third, when we compute the eﬀect of the additional liberalization by the TRIAD we do not add any
reciprocity eﬀects. In practice, we would expect that the TRIAD would attempt to negotiate further
reductions from other countries.
4 Implementation, scope and reﬁnement of the subsidy scheme
4.1 Implementations issues
We have already analyzed the budgetary cost of a switch to the subsidy scheme. Any costs from setting
up and running the subsidy are unlikely to be signiﬁcantly larger than those of running the preference
scheme that it would replace.44 However, we now brieﬂy discuss some simple diﬀerences that may be
present in running each scheme.
When the value of the subsidy and tariﬀ rate are identical the two are exactly equivalent both in
terms of their eﬀects on prices and quantities and actual implementation. The exporter receiving a
42Note that for non-LDC countries our welfare estimates do not include the eﬀects associated with preference erosion
in the TRIAD markets.
43As a benchmark this model predicts that a 33% reduction in all MFN tariﬀs in the world provides a net welfare gain
of approximately only $47 billion.
44The main reason for this is that many of the procedures and requirements for a subsidy to be granted to a speciﬁc
shipment are already in place. For example a shipment must be inspected to ensure that the goods are eligible for
preferential treatment and the exporter must provide evidence of compliance with rules of origin.
20preference obtains pw+t per unit, the domestic price in the preference granting country, as soon as the
shipment is considered eligible. The importer pays pw + t.45 Under the subsidy the exporter receives
pw +s,w h i c hi se q u a lt opw +t when t = s, because if a buyer oﬀers less there is always another buyer
willing to pay up to pw+t in the preference granting country. The buyer actually pays pw+t+s before
he receives the rebate equivalent to the amount of the subsidy per unit s.I ft h i si sd o n ea tc u s t o m s
then the buyer’s price is simply pw + t.46 Here the subsidy is implemented as an immediate drawback
scheme. Drawback schemes already exist in the TRIAD to rebate import duties when the imported
g o o di sr e - e x p o r t e do ru s e da sa ni n p u ti nt h ep r o d u c t i o no fa ne x p o r t e dg o o d .T h eo b j e c t i v eo ft h e
drawback with an import subsidy is diﬀerent but the mechanics are identical. This discussion should
also make clear that the subsidy scheme is no more or less transparent than the preference scheme.
Therefore, political economy arguments that the subsidy scheme is somewhat more transparent, and
thus less likely to be adopted by the government, are not convincing.
Two diﬀerences arise when the MFN rate falls to t  <s .T h e ﬁrst is the direct budgetary cost
that we already discussed: customs collects t  per unit and must rebate s. As our estimates show,
to the extent that the subsidy scheme applies only to LDCs, this cost is small and can be ﬁnanced
directly out of tariﬀ revenue.47 We should also point out that, from the domestic legal perspective of
the country granting preferences, the budget implications of a subsidy are no diﬀerent from the ones
with the preferences. In the U.S. for example any foregone tariﬀ revenue from a new preference must
be estimated and an alternative for its replacement in the budget must be oﬀered. There are also
precedents for the use of import subsidies in the E.U. for example.48, 49
The second issue that may arise after the MFN tariﬀ falls below the subsidy is re-exports. After
importing the good the buyer can ship it back to an agent in the SRC and re-export it. This transaction
is only proﬁtable if the excess subsidy, s − t ,i ss u ﬃciently high to oﬀset the transaction cost. This
includes the cost of forging the certiﬁcation of the origin of the good and the two-way transport cost,
45We are assuming that there are no intermediaries and the importer does not capture any of the preferential rents.
There is some evidence that in practice these rents may be divided between exporter and importer. (Olarreaga and Ozden
[2005])
46If there is a friction such that the subsidy rebate is uncertain or delayed so that the importer expects to receive only
a fraction of it then the exporter price will be reduced accordingly.
47For example it is about $21 million for the U.S. whereas its tariﬀ revenue in 2003 was nearly $20 billion.
48“Where the supplies [of sugar] available within the Community or a major consuming region are no longer suﬃcient,
import subsidies may be granted.” In Council Regulation (EC) No 1260/2001 of 19 June 2001 on the common organization
of the markets in the sugar sector.
49Winters (2004) suggests devoting 25 % of the funds saved by reducing trade-distorting agricultural support to a
compensation fund, which would help compensate for preference erosion. Our calculations suggest that 0.0001 % would
be enough to compensate LDCs provided the subsidy scheme was implemented.
21w h i c hi nm o s tg o o d sw i l lm a k ei tu n p r o ﬁtable particularly if the origin country is an LDC since they
typically have high transport costs.50 If we add to this the foregone interest on the sale of the good
because of the time that the two-way shipment takes it is unlikely that re-exports would be proﬁtable.51
4.2 Scope and reﬁnements
In deciding which countries the subsidy should apply to there may be room for a ﬁner distinction. The
rationale of our model applies more strongly to countries that are “strategically large”, that is whose
cooperation in certain non-trade issues is important to the country granting the preference. Proposals
to “buy-out” preferences, that is to oﬀer a lump-sum payment in exchange for the elimination of
unilateral preferences, or provide temporary adjustment assistance through grants (Hoekman [2004])
or loans (IMF [2004]), are unlikely to work for those countries.52 For example, the U.S. had the
opportunity to oﬀer only cash for Colombia’s cooperation on the war on drugs and it chose not to.
Other countries are not strategically large and receive preferences, under the GSP for example,
simply because they belong to a group that is eligible for them. For the latter set of countries a buy-
out is feasible and would remove their opposition to MTL due to preference erosion. However, it is
impossible to make any general claim about whether such a buy-out would represent an improvement for
those countries. Among other things this would depend on whether the preferences caused investment
in sectors with a comparative advantage, the eventual use of the money from the buy-out and its
opportunity cost.
The subsidy scheme we analyzed until now mimics preferences in terms of the production incentives
it provides for preference receiving countries. Therefore this particular form of the subsidy will not
appeal to critics of preferences that argue they caused investment in sectors where the countries had a
comparative disadvantage in (e.g. Tangermann [2002]). But our constraint that the subsidy rate equal
the current preference rate is simply a convenient benchmark to evaluate the welfare eﬀects. In fact, if
50For evidence on the importance of transport costs for LDCs see Limão and Venables (2001).
51If re-exports were a problem one solution would be to implement the subsidy rebate only when the good was internally
sold. Since internal sales entail the payment of value added tax this would serve as an additional wedge that would have
to be overcome in order for re-exports to be proﬁtable.
52The IMF’s proposed program is in the form of loans to ﬁnance temporary adjustment costs if the MFN tariﬀ reductions
cause a signiﬁcant balance of payment eﬀect on the beneﬁciary countries. Even if this program compensated for the full
amount of preference erosion it would not be able to deliver the same MFN tariﬀ reduction as the subsidy proposed. The
r e a s o nf o rt h i si st h a ta f t e rt h eM F Nt a r i ﬀ reduction the granting countries can only threaten to remove a smaller amount
of preferences. Thus they will be able to extract less in the form of side conditions than before the MFN reduction (or
subsidy scheme). This implies that the granting countries themselves will oﬀer fewer MFN reductions under the IMF
program than under the subsidy scheme.
22we believe that the pattern of export specialization from all preference receivers should be more closely
aligned with relative world prices then the solution is simple: for each of them use a ﬁxed subsidy rate
that is equal for all the products it exports to all preference granting countries. This maintains the
relative prices in the receiver equal to the world’s relative prices. So the subsidy can be designed in
a way that addresses problems of specialization in the wrong sector and still minimizes the stumbling
block eﬀect.
5C o n c l u s i o n
The large numbers of recent PTAs suggest that policy makers have decided they are desirable. Nonethe-
less the potential costs of these agreements in terms of their eﬀect on multilateral liberalization must be
estimated and taken seriously. In this paper we described recent theoretical and empirical evidence that
preferential liberalization can slow down multilateral liberalization even when the countries receiving
the preference are small from a trade perspective. As large developed countries often use unilateral
preferences to small countries as a payment for cooperation in non-trade issues they will hold back their
own MTL to be able to provide preferential tariﬀs below the MFN value. In this setup, decoupling
preferences from MFN liberalization can be Pareto improving provided that the alternative policy is
designed to target the problem. Our proposal is conceptually very simple; use import subsidies, pos-
sibly with the initial rate ﬁxed at the current preference. As we argued the subsidies would ensure
that the countries that receive preferences would move from opposing MFN reductions in the granting
countries to supporting it. The granting countries could maintain their preferential treatment, now via
subsidies, and thus continue to extract cooperation from those countries in a range of other issues on
which preferences are conditional.
We provide the ﬁrst estimates of the welfare costs of PTAs as a stumbling block to multilateral
liberalization. Our focus is on the subset of preferences that the E.U., U.S. and Japan extend to LDCs
and we use the import subsidy scheme as a feasible counterfactual to calculate the opportunity cost of
these preferences. This cost is $2934 million per year for the TRIAD, or, to put it diﬀerently, the E.U.,
U.S. and Japan would gain $2934 million per year if they switched from the preference to the subsidy
scheme in the context of the liberalization anticipated in the Doha round. This occurs because under
the subsidy those countries can now further reduce their MFN tariﬀs without negatively aﬀecting the
beneﬁts associated with the “side payment”. The switch would also increase annual welfare in LDCs
by $520 million and in the rest of the world by $900 million.
23The aggregate annual welfare cost of $4354 million generated by these preferences is likely to be a
lower bound. First, it applies only to the unilateral preferences extended to a subset of countries and
estimates of the stumbling block eﬀect are larger when they apply to all PTA partners, so there would
be a bigger potential for MTL if the switch applied to all of the TRIAD’s PTAs. Second, to estimate
the eﬀects at the product level we must use a model with no dynamic gains from trade. Finally, it is
still possible that the issue of preference erosion could derail the Doha round, which would imply that
the relevant counterfactual under the preference scheme would entail no MTL and consequently be at
least an order of magnitude costlier than we estimate: in the context of our simple model this would
entail an additional gain of $47 billion per year.
In terms of implementation, the budgetary costs, that are often raised when a subsidy is discussed,
are small, at least in the case of the TRIADS’ preferences to LDCs. Moreover, as we argued above,
the logistical costs of running the subsidy scheme are in principle not signiﬁcantly higher than the ones
associated with the preference scheme. However, in implementing the subsidy scheme two questions
would have to be addressed: its legality in the WTO and its scope. From a legal perspective the
subsidies conﬂict with the MFN principle. However, this could easily be addressed in the same way
as preferences, which also constitute exceptions to MFN and are allowed either through the Enabling
Clause or article XXIV for example. In terms of the scope we must consider if the proposal should
extend to all countries that receive unilateral preferences. The basic argument in answering this
question is identical to the one presented for LDCs. Naturally the budgetary cost for the TRIAD
would be higher but the additional MFN liberalization that would result may be suﬃcient to oﬀset
it. Extending the group beyond LDCs may have an additional advantage. Under the subsidy the
beneﬁciaries gain from MFN liberalization in the TRIAD and therefore the large traders among the
beneﬁciaries would have an incentive to engage in reciprocal trade liberalization.
A broader question is whether all PTAs, and not simply ones featuring unilateral preferences, should
be replaced with a subsidy scheme. Conceptually the problem of preference erosion occurs whenever a
preference over the MFN rate is given. Moreover, there is evidence of other types of PTAs by the E.U.
and the U.S. that have slowed down their respective MTL. So similar exercises can be carried out to
calculate the welfare costs of these other PTAs. 53 However, to provide a full characterization of the
eﬀect of PTAs on MTL this should be complemented with evidence on the eﬀect of NAFTA on Canada
53Limão (2005) ﬁnds that NAFTA and other U.S. PTAs also slowed down its multilateral liberalization. Karacavaoli
and Limão (2005) ﬁnd that the E.U.’s PTA with the Central European and with the EFTA countries had a similar eﬀect.
24or Mexico’s MTL and the E.U.’s PTA partners. To the extent that the U.S. and the E.U. are the largest
traders the evidence for them must carry a considerable weight but additional studies of the eﬀects
of PTAs by smaller countries on their MTL would also be useful in determining whether all PTAs
should be decoupled from MFN liberalization through an import subsidy or some other alternative.
This broader question should be addressed in future research.
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28Appendix
World partial equilibrium model
The change in export revenue and import revenue associated with a change in tariﬀs for good i is:
ˆ xrev
ic =( 1 +  xi,c)ˆ pw
i (18)
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where σmi,c and σxi,c are respectively the share of country c’s exports and imports of i in total world
trade. Note that the numerator in (20) only involves a sum over the product subject to preferences in the
TRIAD when calculating the percentage change in world prices induced by the additional liberalization
that the move towards the subsidy scheme implies. In this case we use the import and export shares
as well as the MFN tariﬀ that arise after the initial 33% reduction in tariﬀs to evaluate (18).
Preferential programs and the GATT/WTO
The MFN clause in Article I of GATT 1947 requires that “any advantage, favor, privilege or immunity
granted by any contracting party to any product originating in or destined for any other country
shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like product originating in or destined for
the territories of all other contracting parties.” On its own MFN precludes PTAs. However, there
are three provisions in the WTO that allow exceptions to MFN: a PTA is GATT-legal if it falls under
article XXIV, the Enabling Clause or article V of GATS (trade in services). Article XXIV, under which
PTAs among developed countries typically fall, can be used by any country if (i) the tariﬀ reductions
are reciprocal and eventually zero, (ii) the agreement covers substantially all trade and, (iii) when a
common external tariﬀ is adopted, it does not exceed the average of the existing tariﬀ of the member
countries in the preferential agreement prior to it. These conditions are waived for PTAs among
developing countries under the Enabling Clause, which also encompasses GSP. The GSP was originally
granted as a 10-year waiver from MFN in 1971 and according to it developed countries may oﬀer
tariﬀs below the negotiated MFN values to developing countries. In addition to these three provisions
countries use ad-hoc temporary waivers to provide unilateral preferences to individual countries, e.g.
the U.S.’s Caribbean Basin Initiative and Andean Trade Pact and the E.U.’s Cotonou agreement.
In section 3.3 we focus on unilateral tariﬀ preferences granted by the TRIAD to LDCs, which gen-
erally go beyond the GSP preferences available to non- LDCs. Under its Everything But Arms (EBA)
initiative, the E.U. grants duty free and quota free access to all products (except arms) originating
29in LDCs since March 2001. A transition period was provided for the phasing out of tariﬀso ns u g a r ,
rice and bananas until 2009. Under Japan’s preferential scheme, the LDCs beneﬁt from duty free and
quota free access for all their manufacturing exports. The number of LDCs agricultural and ﬁshery
products that can enter duty free increased to around 50 items after a reform in April 2003. Half of
U.S. tariﬀ lines (around 4500) oﬀer duty free access under the GSP program. Since May 1997 LDCs
are oﬀered duty free access on an additional 1783 tariﬀ lines. Under AGOA 23 LDCs are oﬀered duty
free access on an additional 1835 tariﬀ lines.
Imports from LDCs amounted to $8 billion for the E.U. (2001), $1 billion for Japan and $7 billion
for the U.S. Estimates by UNCTAD (2003) suggest that 99.8% of dutiable E.U. imports from LDCs
are covered by their LDCs preferences, that ﬁgure is 44% for the U.S. and 53 for Japan. The utilization
rate of those preferences is 76% for the E.U., 57% for Japan and 96 percent for the U.S. Bangladesh
and Cambodia are the top beneﬁciaries of tariﬀ preferences among LDCs in the E.U. and Japan.
Madagascar and Malawi are the main beneﬁciaries of U.S. preferences.
Side conditions
GSP and other unilateral preferences provided by the U.S. and the E.U. often have side conditions
attached that are valued by the preference-granting country and potentially costly to the recipient.
That is these unilateral preferences, to whatever extent they are used, are not free to developing
countries.
Consider GSP for example. Although GSP was designed to promote the development of poorer
countries based on an infant industry argument.(UNCTAD [1964]) and it does not require reciprocal
trade concessions on the part of the developing countries in the context of the GATT “during the last
twenty-ﬁve years or so the experience of the GSP in the GATT system has been that for a number of
reasons the preference-granting national entities (i.e. the industrialized countries) often succumb to the
temptation to use the preference systems as part of ‘bargaining chips’ of diplomacy.” (Jackson, p.160)
This has been possible partly because “the preferences extended under the GSP are privileges rather
than enforceable rights.” (UNCTAD [2000], p.19) This means that granting countries can withdraw
preferences in a GATT-legal way, that is without being subject to GATT sanctioned retaliations.
Both the U.S. and the E.U. explicitly oﬀer reductions in trade barriers in exchange for cooperation
on various non-trade issues such as labor, environment, drug traﬃcking and intellectual property.
Examples of these have included the Eastern European and Mediterranean agreements signed by the
E.U.; the U.S.’s agreements with Jordan, Mexico and other Latin American and Caribbean countries;
and the preferential treatment that the E.U. and the U.S. extend to most developing countries through
GSP.54
The legality of some of the additional preferences that are given only to sub-groups of developing is
currently being challenged in the WTO; however the practice is still prevalent.55 Moreover, even if the
unilateral schemes being challenged are replaced by PTAs that require a reduction in the small country’s
protection the compliance with the side conditions will continue to play a key role in the developed
country’s desire to pursue those agreements. A ﬁnal implication of this is that the model that we
discuss in section 2.1 applies not only to the case of unilateral preferences but whenever cooperation
in non-trade issues in the context of a PTA is an important component.
54See USITC 1994 and 1996 for conditions applying to the ATPA. See Bayard and Elliot (1994) and UNCTAD (2000)
for details on conditionality in the GSP program. See Perroni and Whalley (2000) for details on conditionality in Nafta.
See Winters (1993) for details on the E.U.’s Eastern European, Mediterranean and GSP programs, the latter is also
described by UNCTAD (2002).
55India has challenged the preferences that the E.U. grants to Pakistan and other countries for cooperation on drugs.
30Table A1: Preference erosion and subsidy by Beneﬁciary Country (millions of US$)a
SRC European Union Japan United States
name code Pref. erosion Subsidy Pref. erosion Subsidy Pref. erosion Subsidy
Afghanistan AFG 0.28 0.64 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Angola AGO 3.08 4.10 0.07 0.20 0.00 0.00
Bangladesh BGD 193.61 346.86 6.55 11.17 1.90 2.48
Benin BEN 0.61 1.19 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Bhutan BTN 0.04 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01
Burkina Faso BFA 0.55 1.19 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
Burundi BDI 0.03 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Cambodia KHM 20.80 41.74 5.40 10.76 0.17 0.33
Cape Verde CPV 0.37 0.75 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.15
Centra Afr. R. CAF 0.56 0.79 0.00 0.00 1.55 0.85
Chad TCD 0.02 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Comorros COM 0.04 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Congo CON 0.27 0.47 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02
Djibouti DJI 0.05 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Eq. Guinea GNQ 0.02 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Eritrea ERI 0.29 0.45 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Ethiopia ETH 0.87 2.04 0.03 0.06 0.06 0.18
Gambia GMB 0.58 0.87 0.05 0.08 0.00 0.01
Guinea GIN 2.59 3.27 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.04
Guinea-Bissau GNB 0.22 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Haiti HTI 0.23 0.37 0.01 0.01 1.08 2.61
Kiribatib KIR N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A.
Lao LAO 6.77 13.02 0.12 0.30 0.00 0.00
Lesotho LSO 0.25 0.29 0.00 0.00 22.90 18.78
Liberia LBR 0.79 2.27 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02
Madagascar MDG 45.42 63.52 0.08 0.15 18.14 15.18
Malawi MWI 40.77 39.64 0.01 0.01 110.28 25.42
Maldives MDV 3.84 4.31 0.03 0.04 0.00 0.00
Mali MLI 1.22 1.58 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.05
Mauritania MRT 5.91 8.75 1.28 2.60 0.00 0.00
Mozambique MOZ 11.17 14.21 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.04
Myanmar MMR 20.55 37.85 1.79 3.59 0.12 0.33
Nepal NPL 4.78 11.55 0.72 1.88 0.37 0.62
Niger NER 0.48 0.90 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.04
Rwanda RWA 0.03 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
Samoa WSM 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.01
Sao Tome & P. STP 0.77 0.93 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
Senegal SEN 19.68 28.41 0.06 0.13 0.02 0.05
Sierra Leone SLE 5.33 11.27 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.04
Solomon Isl. SLB 2.01 2.14 0.20 0.34 0.00 0.00
Somalia SOM 0.04 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02
Sudan SDN 0.84 1.41 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
Tanzania TZA 28.22 30.98 0.04 0.09 8.29 3.15
Togo TGO 0.55 0.96 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.04
Tuvalu TUV 0.02 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Uganda UGA 8.12 7.82 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.03
Vanuatu VUT 0.03 0.08 0.08 0.17 0.01 0.02
Yemen YEM 1.12 1.42 0.02 0.04 0.00 0.00
Zambia ZMB 6.38 9.72 0.00 0.00 0.40 0.63
aSource: Authors’ calculations
bWe do not have any export, import or tariﬀ data on Kiribati.
31Table A2: Changes in net Welfare by Least Developed Countriesa
Welfare Change
SRC SRC Total Per capita over GDPb
name code (US$ million) (US$ per capita) (percent)
Afghanistan AFG 0.26 0.01 0.01
Angola AGO 2.59 0.2 0.02
Bangladesh BGD 175.72 1.31 0.36
Benin BEN 0.53 0.08 0.02
Bhutan BTN 0.05 0.06 0.01
Burkina Faso BFA 0.48 0.04 0.02
Burundi BDI 0.01 0 0
Cambodia KHM 23.55 1.8 0.6
Cape Verdec CPV 0.4 0.88 0.06
Centra Afr. R. CAF 1.67 0.44 0.16
Chad TCD 0.01 0 0
Comorrosb COM 0.04 0.07 0.02
Congo COG 0.19 0.05 0.01
Djibouti DJI -0.07 -0.1 -0.01
Eq. Guinea GNQ 0.01 0.02 0
Eritrea ERI 0.25 0.06 0.04
Ethiopia ETH 0.87 0.01 0.01
Gambiab GMB 0.55 0.4 0.14
Guinea GIN 2.21 0.29 0.07
Guinea-Bissau GNB 0.17 0.12 0.08
Haitib HTI 0.78 0.1 0.02
Kiribatid KIR N.A N.A. N.A.
Lao LAO 6.16 1.13 0.34
Lesothob LSO 18.14 10.26 2.09
Liberia LBR 0.78 0.24 0.15
Madagascar MDG 53.06 3.27 1.16
Malawi MWI 116.94 11 6.66
Maldives MDV 3.05 10.76 0.47
Mali MLI 1.01 0.09 0.03
Mauritania MRT 6.13 2.36 0.61
Mozambique MOZ 9.47 0.52 0.25
Myanmar MMR 19.96 2.6 1.23
Nepal NPL 5.43 0.23 0.1
Niger NER 0.45 0.04 0.02
Rwanda RWA 0.01 0 0
Samoab WSM 0.05 0.29 0.02
Sao Tome & P.b STP 0.65 4.26 1.32
Senegal SEN 17.06 1.73 0.33
Sierra Leone SLE 4.83 0.93 0.65
Solomon Isl. SLB 1.84 4.21 0.67
Somalia SOM 0.04 0 0
Sudan SDN 0.53 0.02 0
Tanzania TZA 29.82 0.86 0.32
Togo TGO 0.53 0.11 0.04
Tuvalu TUV 0.01 0 0
Uganda UGA 6.65 0.27 0.11
Vanuatu VUT 0.08 0.39 0.03
Yemen YEM 0.84 0.05 0.01
Zambia ZMB 5.95 0.59 0.16
aSource: Authors’ calculations.
bGDP is for the year 2002 and it is measured in current US $.
cExcludes changes in tariﬀ revenue due to lack of tariﬀ data. The direction of the bias is unclear, but it is probably
small since changes in tariﬀ revenue represent on average less than 1 percent of the total welfare change.
dWe do not have any export, import or tariﬀ data on Kiribati.
32Table A3: Descriptive statisticsa
SRC European Union Japan United States
code tb tpc Imports Shared tb tpc Imports Shared tb tpc Imports Shared
(%) (%) (mill. $) (%) (%) (%) (mill. $) (%) (%) (%) (mill. $) (%)
AFG 1.2 0 53 0.002 3.1 0 0 0.000 0.5 0.3 1 0.000
AGO 0.6 0 683 0.030 7.8 0.4 3 0.001 0 0 170 0.014
BGD 11.5 0 2905 0.127 17.4 0 117 0.033 10.8 10.7 2595 0.220
BEN 2.4 0 49 0.002 NAe NA 0 0.000 0.8 0.1 2 0.000
BTN 3.6 0 3 0.000 8.1 2.8 0 0.000 3.3 2.3 1 0.000
BFA 3.6 0 34 0.001 8.3 2.7 5 0.001 3.2 3 3 0.000
BDI 0.2 0 34 0.001 6.7 5.6 1 0.000 00 8 0 . 0 0 1
KHM 12.5 0 321 0.014 23.9 0 52 0.015 11.4 11.4 877 0.074
CPV 5.5 0 13 0.001 7.8 0 0 0.000 3.1 0 5 0.000
CAF 0.4 0 208 0.009 NA NA 1 0.000 29.2 0.1 3 0.000
TCD 0.6 0 11 0.000 20 0 0 . 0 0 0 00 5 0 . 0 0 0
COG 1.6 0 179 0.008 1.4 0.5 20 0.006 0.5 0.5 173 0.015
COM 1.7 0 6 0.000 0.7 0 0 0.000 0.9 0 0 0.000
DJI 2.3 0 5 0.000 NA NA 0 0.000 3.3 0.2 0 0.000
GNQ 1.4 0 35 0.002 0 0 43 0.012 0 0 49 0.004
ERI 4.8 0 9 0.000 2.5 0 0 0.000 7.9 7.8 0 0.000
ETH 0.9 0 218 0.010 9.4 0 59 0.017 0.6 0 31 0.003
GMB 2.8 0 30 0.001 8.7 4.4 4 0.001 3.6 1.5 0 0.000
GIN 1.6 0 204 0.009 8.5 0.3 3 0.001 0.7 0.3 10 0.001
GNB 8.1 0 4 0.000 NA NA 0 0.000 0.1 0 0 0.000
HTI 2.1 0 17 0.001 5.1 0 1 0.000 13.5 12.6 302 0.026
KIR 4.8 0 0 0.000 2.6 1.8 14 0.004 0.1 0 1 0.000
LAO 10.7 0 118 0.005 3.2 0 12 0.003 15.6 15.6 10 0.001
LSO 1.3 0 21 0.001 NA NA 0 0.000 11.2 0 146 0.012
LBR 0.7 0 373 0.016 4.9 0.6 0 0.000 0 0 47 0.004
MDG 11.8 0 521 0.023 8.9 1.2 25 0.007 10.1 0 132 0.011
MWI 23.1 0 155 0.007 5.6 4.3 52 0.015 37.5 0 58 0.005
MDV 17.2 0 24 0.001 9.3 0.1 4 0.001 10.8 10.8 99 0.008
MLI 4.2 0 37 0.002 3.1 0 1 0.000 0.9 0.3 9 0.001
MRT 2.6 0 325 0.014 8.3 5.2 80 0.023 7.2 6.4 0 0.000
MOZ 9.6 0 146 0.006 0.6 0 23 0.007 0.3 0 26 0.002
MMR 11.7 0 342 0.015 9.2 0.9 118 0.034 13 12.9 506 0.043
NPL 6.9 0 162 0.007 6.8 0 28 0.008 9.1 8.9 251 0.021
NER 1 0 92 0.004 5.6 0.2 1 0.000 0.7 0.1 7 0.001
RWA 0.3 0 30 0.001 2.6 0 0 0.000 0.1 0 5 0.000
WSM 60 1 0 . 0 0 0 13.7 1 0 0.000 1.6 1.4 6 0.000
STP 8.6 0 11 0.000 5.1 0 1 0.000 2.1 0.3 0 0.000
SEN 8.6 0 321 0.014 8.2 5.4 6 0.002 1.5 0 4 0.000
SLE 8.1 0 135 0.006 8.4 0 1 0.000 21 . 1 4 0 . 0 0 0
SLB 16.8 0 12 0.001 2.5 0 23 0.006 0.2 0.1 0 0.000
SOM 3.1 0 2 0.000 NA NA 0 0.000 4.1 0.5 0 0.000
SDN 1.5 0 106 0.005 8.3 5.3 22 0.006 00 2 0 . 0 0 0
TZA 9.8 0 301 0.013 2.9 0.2 45 0.013 9 0 32 0.003
TGO 2.4 0 40 0.002 5.8 0 0 0.000 30 . 3 5 0 . 0 0 0
TUV 5.3 0 1 0.000 NA NA 0 0.000 10 8.9 0 0.000
UGA 3.7 0 199 0.009 4.5 3.9 12 0.003 0.1 0 23 0.002
VUT 4.2 0 2 0.000 22.8 17.8 17 0.005 20 1 0 . 0 0 0
YEM 4.5 0 46 0.002 7.4 5.8 19 0.005 00 5 0 . 0 0 0
ZMB 8.9 0 105 0.005 0 0 93 0.026 3.6 0 17 0.001
aSee Data section in the text.
bImport weighted MFN tariﬀ. Import weights are for imports from the SRC.
cImport weigthed preferential tariﬀ. Import weights are for imports from the SRC.
dShare of each SRC in total TRIAD member imports.
eNA occurs when either Japan has no imports from that particular SRC or when we have no tariﬀ data available on
any of the products imported from that country.
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